



# Integral Energy

## Review of Regulated Retail Tariffs and Charges for Electricity 2007 to 2010


8 September 2006

# Outline

- Integral Energy – who we are
- Context for the 2007 Retail Review
- Integral's experience under the 2004 Retail Determination
- Form of regulation
- Costs to be recovered
- Customer assistance package

# Integral Energy – Who we are

# Integral Energy




- Integral Energy is a NSW Energy Corporation that holds Distribution and Retail Licences
- Over 820,000 customers
- Over \$1.2bn in revenue
- All of Integral Energy's regulated customers are within our network supply area
- Any 'small' retail customer within our supply area is eligible to purchase electricity under our default retail contract

# Issues facing Integral Energy

- We are facing extensive growth
- We must be responsible
  - In how we secure and deliver our energy sources
  - In managing customers in hardship
  - In meeting customers' increasing expectations
- We are undertaking trials to provide customers with more tools to signal, and manage, their consumption and bill outcomes

## Context for the 2007 Retail Review


# Integral's residential customers have seen significant real price reductions



Source: ABS CPI data, Integral Energy

# Integral's regulated retail tariffs are at the lower end of the Australian market

**2006 Domestic Electricity Prices**  
Average Default Residential Prices in Australia  
(7MWh pa Customer ; Ex GST)



Source: Various Public Retailer and Network Websites



# Changes from the 2004 Retail Review

- Significant changes between the TOR for the 2007 Retail Review and the TOR for the 2004 Review are that the Tribunal:
  - Must ensure that regulated tariffs are at cost reflective levels by 30 June 2010
  - Is now required to recognise retailers' hedging, risk management and transaction costs (against a background of the cessation of ETEF)
  - Must consider an allowance for electricity purchase costs based on LRMC of new entrant generation
  - Must recognise the Net System Load Profiles (NSLPs) of each standard retailer
  - Must consider retail operating costs and margin based on a "mass market new entrant"

# Principles underpinning Integral's submission [1]

- An effective competitive market is in place in NSW
- To facilitate competition and support a viable retail business, regulated retail prices must:
  - Be at cost reflective levels within a reasonable time frame
  - Incorporate an allowance for hedging, risk management and transaction costs associated with the phase out of ETEF
  - Include a reasonable allowance for retail costs and margin
  - Allow for the full pass through of network charges
  - Support demand management by not unduly restricting retailers from rebalancing tariffs

# Principles underpinning Integral's submission [2]

- The retail electricity market is already competitive with regulation beyond 2010 for customer protection purposes
- Regulated tariffs should be simple and provide maximum flexibility to eliminate obsolete tariffs
- The approach must appropriately balance commercial and customer outcomes

## Integral's experience under the 2004 Retail Determination




*The power is in your hands*

# Learnings from the 2004 Retail Determination

- Tribunal allowances for Integral's energy costs, operating costs and retail margin are below the levels set by regulators in other states in recent decisions
- The current form of regulation is not appropriate given a competitive environment:
  - Too prescriptive with requirement to transition tariffs to target and to introduce new tariffs at target
  - Too restrictive with side constraints applied at individual tariff level, limiting the ability to:
    - Move to cost reflective levels
    - Rationalise obsolete tariffs

# Lessons from Full Retail Competition



- Few barriers to customers accessing the benefits of the retail electricity market
- Customers across Integral's customer base as a whole are being offered competitive contracts

**Appropriate form of regulation**

# Reducing reliance on regulated tariffs

- A key aspect of the TOR for the 2007 Retail Review state that:

*The Tribunal must consider the Government's policy aim of reducing customers' reliance on regulated prices and the effect of its determination on competition in the retail electricity market.*

- The Government's aim of reducing reliance on regulated tariffs is a key consideration for the Tribunal in its approach to the form of regulation



# Updating the form of regulation

- Overall aims should be to:
  - Recognise this Determination is a step to removing retail price regulation
  - Achieve full cost reflectivity of regulated retail tariffs and charges by the end of determination
  - Allow the rationalisation of regulated retail tariffs, particularly removal of obsolete tariffs
  - Ensure full pass through of network tariffs and other costs outside Integral's control
  - Facilitate demand management

# Proposed Form of Regulation

- The Tribunal should modify the current regulatory approach by:
  - In an 'N+R' approach, regulating the 'R-component' only, as 'N-component' already regulated
  - Relying on “weighted average price” cap, rather than individual Target Tariffs
  - Removing side constraints at the individual tariff level
  - Adopting a pass through mechanism for unforeseen events
  - Using forecast quantities

## Costs to be recovered

# Integral's proposal for recovery of costs

- There are three broad categories of retail costs that the Tribunal should recognise in forming its Determination:
  - Energy costs
  - Retail margin
  - Retail operating costs

# Energy costs


# Integral's position on energy costs

- Integral believes that an increase in the Energy Purchase Cost Allowance (EPCA) is required due to:
  - LRMC used in current retail determination based on conservative assumptions
  - Terms of Reference for this review require Tribunal to recognise the higher volatility and higher ratio of peak energy contained in Integral's Net System Load Profile (NSLP)
- No adjustment to the EPCA to reflect gradual removal of ETEF

# Wholesale Transfer Price (WTP)

- Reliance on LRMC alone is not consistent with full cost reflectivity or effective retail market competition
- The appropriate method for estimating the energy purchase cost allowance for a standalone new entrant retailer is a WTP
- The three main determinants of the WTP are:
  - The NSLP of a representative customer with cost determined by shape X price
  - The estimated cost of purchasing a portfolio of hedges corresponding to each trading period for the forecast NSLP (LRMC used as a proxy)
  - An additional margin to cover energy risk management and transition costs

# Integral's NSLP





## Retail margin and operating cost allowance

# Integral's positions on appropriate retail margin

- Integral believes that the retail margin must rise
- The increase in retail margin is due to:
  - The Tribunal is required to determine appropriate margin for 'mass market new entrant'
  - Therefore, margin must now reflect customer acquisition costs
  - Margin must cover residual hedging risks from ETEF phase out
  - Current margin well below the level allowed in other states

# Retail margin comparison across jurisdictions

|   | Electricity              |           |                            | Gas         |             |             |
|---|--------------------------|-----------|----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|   | IPART                    | ESCOSA    | Vic                        | IPART       | ESCOSA      | Vic         |
| Margin  | 2%                       | 4 to 6.5% | 5-8%+ (CRA)<br>7-9% (Govt) | 2-3% (NERA) | 3.4 to 4.3% | 2-3%+ (CRA) |
| Return on capital (physical assets)                               | ✓                        | ✓         | ✓                          | ✓           | ✓           | ✓           |
| Depreciation  | ✗<br>(incl. in op costs) | ✓         |                            |             | ✓           |             |
| Return on capital (working capital)                               | ✗                        | ✓         | ✓                          |             | ✓           | ✓           |
| Energy purchase risk  | ✗                        | ✗         | ✓                          | ✗           | ✗           |             |
| Riskiness of customer base<br>Competition from energy substitutes | ✓                        | ?         |                            |             |             |             |
| Headroom<br>Uncertainty of operating cost estimates               | ✗                        | ✗         | ✓                          | ✗           | ✗           | ✓           |
| Other   |                          | ✓         |                            |             | ✓           |             |

**Other:** includes Return on capital (intangible assets); Amortisation and Interest and taxes.

# Contribution to retail margin

| Assumption/contribution to margin            | Low          | Medium       | High         |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Customer acquisition costs                   | 300          | 524          | 700          |
| WACC   | 6%           | 8%           | 10%          |
| Average customer life in years (new entrant) | 7            | 10           | 13           |
| Working capital                              | 1mth revenue | 1mth revenue | 1mth revenue |
| Contribution of customer acquisition costs   | 4.1%         | 5.9%         | 7.5%         |
| Contribution of working capital              | 0.5%         | 0.7%         | 0.8%         |
| Contribution for asymmetric risk             | 1%           | 2%           | 3%           |
| Contribution for return on tangible assets   | 0.5%         | 0.7%         | 0.8%         |
| Contribution for return of tangible assets   | 0.8%         | 0.8%         | 0.8%         |
| <b>Total</b>                                 | <b>6.9%</b>  | <b>10.0%</b> | <b>12.9%</b> |

**Margin sensitivity analysis**

# Integral's position on retail operating costs

- Current allowance of \$70 per customer is below levels in recent regulatory decisions, including \$92 per customer in Victoria
- Tribunal is required to consider retail costs for a 'mass market new entrant', rather than standard retailer. Retail costs for new entrant are higher due to:
  - Costs of establishing the physical infrastructure necessary to operate a retail business
- Integral has included customer acquisition cost in retail margin, rather than operating cost

# Customer Protection

# Customer assistance program


- Integral's INpower hardship program has been in place since 2004
- INpower provides the following customer assistance:
  - A dedicated case manager – one representative to allow for consistency
  - Tailored payment plans that best suit the customer's needs
  - No disconnections while the customer is on the program
  - Energy audits by phone or home visit

# Recent improvements in INpower

- Now one of the largest programs in NSW with over 3200 customers enrolled
- Research conducted in May with customers and welfare groups had positive feedback particularly in relation to:
  - Accessibility
  - Flexibility
  - Relationships with Community Welfare Organisations
  - Feelings of safety, relief, hope, calm, respect and patience for customers
- Incentive program for most needy customers – Integral will make an equivalent payment for every 6<sup>th</sup> payment made on time



# INpower enrolments



# Summary

- The 2007 Retail Review is being undertaken at a critical time in the ongoing development of retail competition in NSW
- Decisions on the form of regulation and detailed regulatory parameters will be critical to achieving competitive outcomes
- The relationship that IPART develops between the LRMC and the allowance for energy costs under the phase out of ETEF will be critical aspect of this review
  - A reliance on LRMC alone is not consistent with full cost reflectivity or effective retail market competition
- The Tribunal must consider the Government's policy aim of reducing customers' reliance on regulated prices and the effect of its determination on competition in the retail electricity market